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Clinical
Abstract
Cognitive bias is increasingly recognised as an important source of medical 
error, and is both ubiquitous across clinical practice yet incompletely 
understood. This increasing awareness of bias has resulted in a surge in 
clinical and psychological research in the area and development of various 
‘debiasing strategies’. This paper describes the potential origins of bias 
based on ‘dual process thinking’, discusses and illustrates a number of the 
important biases that occur in clinical practice, and considers potential strategies that might 
be used to mitigate their effect.
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Cognitive bias in clinical medicine
ED O’Sullivan1, SJ Schoﬁ eld2
Introduction
The human brain is a complex organ with the wonderful 
power of enabling man to ﬁ nd reasons for continuing to 
believe whatever it is that he wants to believe.
– Voltaire
Cognitive error is pervasive in clinical practice. Up to 
75% of errors in internal medicine practice are thought to 
be cognitive in origin, and errors in cognition have been 
identiﬁ ed in all steps of the diagnostic process, including 
information gathering, association triggering, context 
formulation, processing and veriﬁ cation.1,2 Further evidence 
can be gleaned from analysis of errors at a veteran’s affairs 
facility, suggesting at least 13% of diagnostic errors relate 
to interpretation of test results and 78.9% involve cognitive 
error during the patient encounter.3 Reﬂ ecting on personal 
errors, doctors identify cognitive factors in 30% of errors in 
the emergency department and 42% in internal medicine 
wards.4,5 As a result, in 2013 the National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine formally explored 
the overlooked role of clinical reasoning and cognition in 
diagnostic errors in their publication Improving Diagnosis in 
Health Care.6 This report bemoans the nationwide lack of 
formal training in clinical decision-making and recognises that 
research into the causes of diagnostic error and education of 
diagnosticians should be a key priority in efforts to minimise 
error and improve patient outcomes. Despite this growing 
awareness of cognitive error, this has proven a challenging 
area to research for a variety of reasons, including a lack of 
high-quality data on prevalence, lack of granularity of data, 
and difﬁ culty studying the somewhat invisible and mysterious 
process of a clinician’s decisions.7–9
Cognitive bias can lead to medical error
An important concept in understanding error is that of 
cognitive bias, and the inﬂ uence this can have on our decision-
making.10–12 Cognitive biases, also known as ‘heuristics’, 
are cognitive short cuts used to aid our decision-making. 
A heuristic can be thought of as a cognitive ‘rule of thumb’ 
or cognitive guideline that one subconsciously applies to a 
complex situation to make decision-making easier and more 
efﬁ cient. It has been recognised within the medical community 
since the 1970s but research has been sporadic and largely 
in ﬁ elds outside of medicine, such as the military, economics 
and business.13 It is now becoming increasingly apparent that 
signiﬁ cant diagnostic error can result from cognitive bias.14 
It is likely that most, if not all, clinical decision-makers are 
at risk of error due to bias – it seems to be a ubiquitous 
phenomenon and does not correlate with intelligence nor any 
other measure of cognitive ability.15 Ironically, a lack of insight 
into one’s own bias is common, demonstrated by doctors 
who described themselves as ‘excellent’ decision-makers 
and ‘free from bias’ subsequently scoring poorly in formal 
test batteries.16,17 The causes of bias are varied, and include 
learned or innate biases, social and cultural biases, a lack 
of appreciation for statistics and mathematical rationality, 
and even simply environmental stimuli competing for our 
attention.18
The goal of current research in the ﬁ eld is thus to recognise, 
understand and potentially to modify or mitigate bias in 
some way. As clinicians we are tasked with trying to minimise 
bias in both our own practice and in that of our juniors and 
students. Accordingly, this paper is a summary of current 
understanding in the ﬁ eld, and practical tips for educators 
and clinicians.
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An illustration of cognitive bias
Consider a young, ﬁ t patient presenting with chest pain. If 
their attending clinician has recently missed a diagnosis of 
aortic dissection they will have been understandably upset 
by such an event, and aortic dissection will now be at the 
forefront of their mind when encountering similar symptoms. 
Our young patient may have no clinical signs to support 
such a diagnosis, and may objectively be of very low risk 
for dissection, but our theoretical clinician is concerned 
regardless. This is an example of the ‘availability bias’ and 
a familiar scenario for those of us in clinical practice. The 
temporally recent events, and the emotional component of 
these events, have resulted in a brain that is now ‘primed’ 
for such a diagnosis. This priming may ultimately lead this 
doctor astray. They will likely expose this young patient 
unnecessarily to ionising radiation because of their bias 
as they request a CT scan ‘just in case’. This effect may be 
compounded by the presence of an additional bias such as 
‘base rate neglect’. Here, the doctor may appreciate that 
aortic dissection is exceedingly rare in such patients (i.e. 
the ‘base rate’ is low) but their ‘base rate neglect’ bias is 
overriding this knowledge and the doctor may order the scan 
regardless of the very low probability of a positive result. The 
concept of the base rate and the phenomenon of base rate 
neglect are hugely important concepts when considering the 
sensitivity and speciﬁ city of diagnostic tests. Furthermore, 
the base rate is the cornerstone of the Bayesian approach 
to inferences – wherein the clinician begins with a ‘pre-test 
likelihood’ of a patient having a condition and modiﬁ es this 
likelihood repeatedly and iteratively (and often quite loosely) 
as test results return and new information is encountered. 
To better appreciate the potential for base rate neglect 
to impeded accurate diagnosis, consider Figure 1. Grid 
A represents a condition with a prevalence of 3% (blue 
squares). Grid B introduces a diagnostic test. Even if this 
test can detect 100% of the cases, a false-positive rate of 
5% (green squares) results in eight positive patients for 
every 100 tested (three true positive, ﬁ ve false positive). 
Thus, for any given patient with a positive result, they have 
a 37.5% chance of having this condition. Consider then grid 
C. The clinician’s decision is now even more complex in the 
case of a rare condition (a lower base rate), a test which 
may not be 100% accurate (i.e. a lower sensitivity) and may 
have a higher false-positive rate (i.e. lower speciﬁ city). When 
interpreting such a test result, neglecting to appreciate the 
true base rate of a condition in your speciﬁ c population is 
to fall at the ﬁ rst hurdle.
Cognitive bias in clinical medicine
While the above scenario describes two speciﬁ c biases in 
clinical practice, there are many more. Unfortunately, data 
are lacking as to the true incidence of speciﬁ c biases in 
medicine, partly due to the absence of primary data itself, 
and the difﬁ culty in extracting such a proximal cause of an 
error in retrospective analysis. This challenge is sometimes 
compounded by the blind spot bias, whereby people ironically 
demonstrate a tendency to appreciate a bias in others, but 
not in themselves.19 This can hinder reﬂ ection and recognition 
of the role of cognitive bias in an adverse event analysis. 
Despite these difﬁ culties a body of knowledge is emerging 
with at least some preliminary data pertaining to important 
biases.20 Table 1 describes some important cognitive biases 
including those that have been formally documented in the 
literature in experimental settings. Clearly there are other 
important biases we encounter daily (e.g. the authors battle 
‘search satisfying’ daily – stopping investigating a problem 
once the ﬁ rst plausible explanation is found; and ‘diagnostic 
momentum’ – continuing the treatment plan started by others 
without stepping back and independently evaluating the 
situation). Expert opinion suggests that many other biases 
beyond those listed have an important impact on medical 
practice.21 In the broader context of patient safety, cognitive 
bias is an important basis of the ‘human factors’ approach 
to patient safety – the relationship between clinicians and the 
systems with which they interact. The failure of information 
acquisition, processing and decision-making relates in part to 
our cognitive bias, and all of the examples and interventions 
discussed could also be understood within the human factors 
paradigm. Indeed, the speculated number of potential biases 
is vast, and their nature varied. We recommend consulting 
one of the exhaustive lists complied by Croskerry should the 
reader wish to study such biases further.22
Figure 1 A description of common biases encountered in clinical medicine and accompanying examples 
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Table 1 Bias in clinical medicine 
Bias
Availability bias More recent and readily available answers and solutions are preferentially favoured because of 
ease of recall and incorrectly perceived importance42,43
Example Recent missed pulmonary embolism prompts excessive CT pulmonary angiogram scanning in low-
risk patients
Base rate neglect This occurs in medicine when the underlying incident rates of conditions or population-based 
knowledge are ignored as if they do not apply to the patient in question82
Example A positive exercise stress test in a young woman prompting an angiogram. The ‘base rate’ is so 
low in this population that this result is more likely false positive than true positive
Conﬁ rmation bias Diagnosticians tend to interpret the information gained during a consultation to ﬁ t their preconceived 
diagnosis, rather than the converse83,84
Example Suspecting the patient has an infection and the raised white cells proves this, rather than ‘I wonder 
why the white cells are raised, what other ﬁ ndings are there?’
Conjunction rule The incorrect belief that the probability of multiple events being true is greater than a single event. 
This relates to ‘Occam’s razor’ – a simple and unifying explanation is statistically more likely than 
multiple unrelated explanations85
Example A confused patient with hypoxia and deranged renal function is far more likely to simply have a 
pneumonia than a subdural/pulmonary embolism/obstruction simultaneously
Overconﬁ dence An inﬂ ated opinion of their diagnostic ability leading to subsequent error. Their conﬁ dence in their 
judgements does not align with the accuracy of these judgements54
Example A doctor trusting their assessment more than they should – particularly problematic with inaccurate 
examinations, such as auscultation for pneumonia
Representativeness Misinterpreting the likelihood of an event considering both the key similarities to its parent 
population, and the individual characteristics that deﬁ ne that event86
Example A man with classic symptoms of a heart attack, but also anxious, and who’s breath smelled of 
alcohol. The latter details have no bearing on the likelihood of a heart attack, nor alter the degree 
to which he is a member of his risk demographic but distract and decrease the diagnostic pick up
Search satisfying Ceasing to look for further information or alternative answers when the ﬁ rst plausible solution is found
Example When encountering an acutely dyspnoeic patient, treating their obvious pneumonia and stopping 
investigations at that point, failing to search for and recognise the secondary myocardial infarction
Diagnostic momentum Continuing a clinical course of action instigated by previous clinicians without considering the 
information available and changing the plan if required (particularly if plan commenced by more 
senior clinician)
Example Fixating on a previously assigned label of ‘possible pulmonary embolism’ and organising CT 
imaging for a patient who may have subsequent results that suggest otherwise (e.g. positive blood 
cultures the following day)
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Origins of bias: dual process thinking
An increasingly established framework for understanding 
the decision-making process is the dual process theory. 
This theory considers our thought process as a type 1 or 
type 2 process, with each pathway characterised by their own 
important attributes.23,24 Type 1 thinking is a fast, intuitive, 
pattern recognition driven method of problem solving, which 
places a low cognitive burden on the user, and allows one 
to make fast and accurate decisions rapidly. In contrast, 
type 2 thinking is a slower more methodical and thoughtful 
process. Type 2 thinking may place a higher cognitive strain 
on the user but allows them to appraise data more critically 
and look beyond patterns, and may potentially be more 
suitable for complex problem solving. Current opinion among 
psychologists is that we spend about 95% of our time in 
type 1 thinking.25 Although very efﬁ cient and time effective, 
cognitive bias and resulting error is thought to be more likely 
to occur during type 1 processing.26,27
It is probable that optimal diagnostic approaches use both type 
1 and type 2 thinking at appropriate times. Non-analytical (type 
1) reasoning is shown to be as effective as reﬂ ective reasoning 
for diagnosing routine clinical cases.28 There is additional 
evidence in the ﬁ eld of emergency medicine that a type 1 ‘gut 
feeling’ assessment of patient’s illness has a role in clinical 
practice, with a reported sensitivity of 74–87% for assessing 
whether a patient is ‘sick’, which is a reasonable output for a 
quick and essentially cost-free test. However, this type 1, rapid 
decision was poor at predicting diagnosis or aiding further 
prognostication.29–31 Furthermore, not all biases originate in 
type 1 processing, but when bias does occur it is thought this 
can only be dealt with by activating type 2 processing. Thus, an 
appropriate balance of type 1 and type 2 processes is required 
for optimal clinical performance.22 Situations of stress, fatigue, 
sleep deprivation and cognitive overload may predispose to 
error and allow cognitive bias to emerge.32
In support of the current psychological research, some 
fascinating objective data are emerging to potentially support 
the dual process theory. There are now functional MRI data 
to support the existence of different cognitive patterns. 
Activation of right lateral prefrontal cortex is noted when a 
logical task is correctly performed and when subjects inhibit 
a cognitive bias (type 2 thinking), a ﬁ nding supporting this 
area’s potential role in cognitive monitoring. In contrast, 
when logical reasoning was overcome by belief bias, activity 
was noted in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, a region 
associated with affective processing (type 1).33 Finally, there 
is some evidence that type 2 processing requires more blood 
glucose, and that alterations of blood glucose can modulate 
the type of processing predominantly used.34
How can we ‘debias’ ourselves?
Given the importance and prevalence of cognitive bias, 
how then can we mitigate its effect on our practice? While 
the authors reviewed strategies to improve student and 
doctor decision-making, there is a dearth of high-quality 
interventional trials attempting to formally cognitively debias 
doctors. What follows is a short appraisal of the evidence 
for current strategies with reference to some key studies.
1. Bias-speciﬁ c teaching sessions
Bias-speciﬁ c teaching seems the most immediately sensible 
approach to the problem. However, teaching critical thinking is 
a challenge, and while it may improve learners’ ‘awareness’ 
of bias,35 interventional studies of teaching sessions 
demonstrated effect sizes that were often insigniﬁ cant or 
small.36,37 For example, research suggests that teaching 
diagnosticians about self-serving bias (i.e. falsely attributing 
positive outcomes to one’s own skill or intervention) does 
not have any measurable clinical impact on their decision-
making.38
The highest quality of evidence comes from a single 
positive randomised controlled trial found in paediatric 
medical literature. The authors taught corrective strategies 
to clinicians (e.g. mnemonics, Bayesian tools) that were 
successful in targeting base rate neglect and search 
satisfying.39 In contrast, a similarly themed experiment 
used a teaching session as an intervention in 57 medical 
students in a Canadian emergency department. The 
strategies employed were a standardised case-based 90 min 
teaching session focused on understanding bias, how to 
identify bias and how to counteract them.40 Results were 
disappointing, as the researchers failed to demonstrate 
retention or any improvement in decision-making with 
Bias
The framing effect Reacting to a particular choice differently depending on how the information is presented to you
Example A pharmaceutical company may present new drug A as having a 95% cure rate, and suggest this 
is superior to drug B that has a signiﬁ cant 2.5% failure rate
Commission bias A tendency towards action rather than inaction. The bias is ‘ommision bias’
Example Historical transfusion targets in gastrointestinal bleeds – the approach was traditionally to aim for 
higher targets rather than do nothing. ‘Better to be safe than sorry’ and to raise the haemoglobin 
‘just in case’
Table 1 cont.
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cognitive forcing strategies. Undeterred, this same research 
group subsequently performed a larger trial of 145 medical 
students, enhanced this time with a control group. Again, the 
researchers failed to demonstrate any difference between 
the two groups; however, the intervention was a rather 
opportunistic additional teaching session during a 4-week 
rotational block. This does not guarantee that students were 
self-implementing the forcing strategies taught. Furthermore, 
the only biases they were attempting to address were the 
again ‘availability bias’ and ‘search-satisfying bias’.41
In conclusion, while focused educational sessions seem 
an intuitive and practical approach to mitigating bias, the 
evidence to support this is mixed and there are certainly 
enough negative studies to suggest it would be a low-yield 
intervention at best.
2. Slowing down
Popularised by Kahneman, slowing down during cognition 
could allow the diagnostician to transition into ‘type 2’ 
thinking, reﬂ ect more critically on data and ultimately make 
fewer errors. Encouragingly, there have been broadly positive 
results from trials attempting to force decision-makers to 
slow down.24 Certainly, diagnostic error due to experimentally 
induced availability bias was mitigated in medical students by 
forced slow deliberation, and diagnostic accuracy was shown 
to be improved by simply slowing cognition in two subsequent 
trials.42,43 Improvement in diagnostic accuracy in non-trial 
settings has been suggested by studies of slowing down 
and consciously deliberating on problems regardless of any 
speciﬁ c underlying bias introduced.44,45 Useful insight into 
the nature of this intervention can be garnered from a trial 
of antibiotic prescribing that demonstrated workﬂ ow changes 
forcing physicians to slow down and consider ‘why’ and 
‘how’ antibiotics were prescribed had a positive impact. Two 
important themes that emerged from the qualitative analysis 
were respondents’ comments that the intervention forced 
their attention to important questions (‘it reminds us to think 
about it’) and induced slow and deliberative reasoning (‘it 
makes you think twice’).46
The data are not unanimously in favour of slowing down, 
however. Canadian residents were randomised to work 
through 20 diagnostic cases at speed, or instead asked to 
slow down. The slower group took 20 s longer per question, 
but failed to show any increase in diagnostic accuracy.47 The 
reason behind the conﬂ icting ﬁ ndings are unclear, but we 
speculate that as most positive studies used experimental 
settings to induce bias, the higher baseline levels of bias 
resulted in a larger effect size allowing interventions to 
reach ‘signiﬁ cance’. This has not curbed the use of ‘slowing 
down’ within the ﬁ eld of surgery, where enforced slowing 
is sometimes implemented in an attempt to encourage 
cognitive refocusing and minimisation of error, although we 
could ﬁ nd no experimental evidence supporting this.48,49
On balance, ‘slowing down’ as an intervention is supported 
by a growing body of evidence and is a simple intervention 
that we could feasibly consider in our own practice.
3. Metacognition and ‘considering alternatives’
Metacognition is the awareness of, and insight into one’s 
own thought processes. Forcing clinicians to ask themselves 
‘what else could this be?’ is a form of metacognition and 
may force one to consider ‘why’ one is pursuing certain 
diagnoses, and consider important alternative scenarios.50 
There are a number of positive studies supporting the role 
of metacognition in improving decision-making. For example, 
experimentally, ‘considering the opposite’ has been shown 
to help mitigate against the anchoring effect.51–53 Similarly, 
overconﬁ dence bias has been tackled rather elegantly in 
a classroom setting, by simply asking students to give an 
estimate of their conﬁ dence. This was sufﬁ cient to improve 
diagnostic accuracy as they reassessed their position and 
often changed their mind – effectively debiasing themselves.54 
Asking neuropsychologists to explain their reasoning when 
answering clinical questions had a similar impact and 
minimised the effect of the hindsight bias.55
Perhaps it is the speciﬁ c bias that determines whether 
metacognition has any beneﬁ t, or even the speciﬁ c approach 
to reﬂ ection. Regardless, metacognition in the broadest 
sense has demonstrated real potential, albeit the nuances 
surrounding the timing and nature of its use remain unclear.
4. Checklists
Checklists have been a simple and popular debiasing strategy 
used clinically and in many industries. They are ideal for 
deployment in a controlled environment with predictable 
patients and procedures, hence their popularity in the 
surgical world. Checklists can be thought of as a cognitive 
forcing tool that demand the user think in a more ordered 
fashion.56–58 Checklists are a debiasing strategy that 
challenges ‘structure’ of thought, attempting to force our 
cognition onto certain topics even if they were not previously 
considered.59,60 Variations on checklists include computerised 
clinical decision support systems that may have a role in 
reducing cognitive load by providing decision aids, guidance 
and differential diagnostic lists.61
Experimentally, checklists were found to increase 
cardiopulmonary examination-related accuracy, but only when 
the user was able to return and re-examine as needed.62 
This suggests to the authors that pre-encounter checklists to 
prime the user are possibly a valuable approach. The nature 
of the checklist and content are likely important factors in 
their efﬁ cacy. Shimizu and colleagues compared the efﬁ cacy 
of a ‘differential diagnosis’ checklist to general ‘debiasing 
checklist’ and found the former to be superior in improving 
diagnostic accuracy.63 Their conclusion was that focusing on 
speciﬁ c negative differentials may be more useful than generic 
approaches – here there is some overlap with metacognitive 
methods. Further research has found checklists to enhance 
ECG interpretation, while adding to the time taken to reach 
diagnosis, but not adding to the perceived cognitive load.64 
The potential advantages of checklists are many (e.g. ease 
of creation and use and low cost) and the experimental 
evidence to support their deployment in medicine is slowly 
accumulating.65–67
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5. Teaching statistical principles
Lack of formal education in statistics and logic is often 
bemoaned by clinicians and researchers alike as an 
explanation for poor insight into underlying principles, thus 
leading to error. While this might seem an obvious remedy, 
experimental evidence only partially supports statistical 
teaching as an effective intervention. On one hand, teaching 
students statistical principles has helped them transfer 
this knowledge to abstract statistical problem solving and 
overcome cognitive bias.68,69 In addition, using ‘analogical’ 
training (teaching students about statistical biases) 
researchers were able to create a lasting effect in students’ 
ability to avoid bias in speciﬁ cally designed questionnaires 
up to 4 weeks later.70,71 However, the effect was varied, and 
speciﬁ cally statistical biases were the most effected by 
teaching intervention, whereas other biases were not. Given 
the range of potential bias in medicine, this limited effect is 
an important drawback. Crucially, these studies only involved 
students in non-clinical scenarios. In contrast, the single 
relevant study in the literature within clinical medicine found 
that despite training in statistics, physicians performed very 
poorly and tended to ignore important prevalence data and 
statistical concepts when problem solving.72 In conclusion, 
much like generic bias-related teaching, a singular focus on 
statistical principles has not been demonstrated to be of 
much clinical utility.
6. Novel methods
Several novel methods exist to mitigate bias. Working on 
the principle that a group of experts is likely to have a more 
accurate answer than an individual,73 dialectical bootstrapping 
is the act of forcing yourself to assume your ﬁ rst estimate to 
a quantitative answer was incorrect and attempting to answer 
again. The average of your two answers is demonstrably more 
accurate.74 This novel method of increasing accuracy may 
obviously have rather speciﬁ c clinical uses, when considering 
arithmetic and quantitative problems. Examples might include 
estimating a patient’s weight at the bedside, or their baseline 
renal function when no historical measurements are available.
Games have been used outside of medical practice to improve 
hypothesis generation. A novel videogame teaching method 
and repetition of a challenge was found to be superior to 
explicit training in mitigating conﬁ rmation and fundamental 
attribution error bias in a group of 703 decision-makers. 
While playing a ﬁ ctionalised scenario, interviewing terror 
suspects, participants were given both implicit and explicit 
feedback on multiple cognitive biases as encountered. This 
proved superior to traditional teaching and an instructional 
video in helping participants avoid new cognitive bias.75 
Such a ﬁ ctionalised interview seems highly transferable to 
clinical medicine, and certainly there is an appetite among 
medical students for the use of games in education.76 Thus 
development of ‘serious games’ of this nature is becoming 
an active ﬁ eld of research, which may have future roles in 
medical training and bias modiﬁ cation.77–79
Conclusion
Undoubtedly cognitive bias is a major contributor to medical 
error and is underrepresented in education and neglected 
in clinical practice. Current literature is limited in terms of 
accurately describing the prevalence and signiﬁ cance of 
speciﬁ c biases, which makes subsequent experimental work 
difﬁ cult. Some encouraging data are emerging suggesting 
there is potential in several interventions, such as formally 
‘slowing down’, checklists and using metacognition, for 
example. The modest effect sizes of positive trials and 
multiple negative trials are helping to build a more complete 
understanding of how to tackle bias. They suggest that formal 
teaching and focusing on statistics may be of limited use, 
and future researchers will need to understand the role of 
such interventions and how they can complement emerging 
novel and metacognitive methods.
The current challenge is extrapolating these experimental 
ﬁ ndings to educational and clinical settings. The literature 
is lacking any longer-term studies with follow-up data to 
demonstrate that any intervention had a lasting effect. 
There remains scepticism as to the role of debiasing from 
some commentators despite some of the promising results 
described.55,80,81 They argue the hardwired nature of some of 
these cognitive biases is unavoidable and to suggest they 
can be easily ﬁ xed seems unlikely. Certainly there are enough 
negative studies to merit such concerns. Thus, the debate 
continues as to whether our biases are inescapable and 
shackle us to our savannah-dwelling ancestors, or rather are 
elegant optimisation protocols reﬁ ned over millennia that we 
will simply need to adapt to modern decision-making.82
Improving our understanding and awareness of our own bias 
seems a sensible ﬁ rst step in enhancing our understanding 
of clinical decision-making, improving patient care, informing 
future research and equipping clinicians for the cognitive 
rigors of clinical medicine. To take a pragmatic approach, we 
suggest it is worthwhile remembering a few important points 
in our medical practice, and following some suggested rules 
for good decision-making, adapted from the BMJ.17
• Slow down.
• Be aware of base rates for your differentials.
• Consider what data is truly relevant.
• Actively seek alternative diagnoses.
• Ask questions to disprove your hypothesis.
• Remember you are often wrong. Consider the immediate 
implications of this. 
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